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HERIBERTO MORAN—HERNANDEZ,

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Defendant-Appellant.

Has Moran-Hernandez failed t0 show the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
sentence 0f ten years with two years ﬁxed on a conviction for aggravated driving under the
inﬂuence?

ARGUMENT
Moran-Hernandez Has Failed To Show The
A.

District Court

Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

In

December of 2018, Heriberto Moran—Hernandez drove

inﬂuence 0f alcohol and got the van stuck in a

ditch.

(PSI, p.5.

1)

his

van while under the

After he contacted his Wife, his

Wife contacted her brothers t0 help Moran-Hernandez get the van out 0f the ditch.
arrived, she

had

Hernandez and

their four children

mph.

(Id.)

(Id.)

his Wife argued and, While three

in their car seats,

She attempted

with her.

Moran Hernandez

to follow

0f the children were in the car but not yet secured

Moran-Hernandez, but was unable

lacerated livers and one With a broken

car.

When she

After removing the van from the ditch, Moran-

got into the car and drove

Moran-Hernandez crashed the

(Id.)

(Id.)

arm and head

to

away

at a

high rate 0f speed.

(Id.)

keep up as he reached speeds of 100

A11 four children were injured, two With

injury.

(Id.)

Moran-Hernandez had a blood

alcohol content of .217, nearly three times the legal limit. (COP Tr., p.19, Ls.18-22.2)

Moran-Hernandez was charged With three counts of aggravated DUI.

(R., pp.70-72.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty t0 one count, While the state agreed to
the remaining

investigator.

move to dismiss

two and endorse whatever recommendation was made by the presentence

(COP

Tr., p.7, Ls.1-12; p.16,

Ls.20-25; p.20, Ls.1-8.) The presentence investigator

noted that Moran-Hernandez was not a legal resident, had been deported twice before, and would
face deportation again following his sentence.

1

(PSI, pp.14-15.)

She recommended “Level

References t0 ‘PSI’ are to the Presentence Report, included in the ﬁle

titled

2.1

‘Appeal —

Conﬁdential Documentspdf.” Page references are t0 the pagination 0f that ﬁle as a whole.
2

Following Moran-Hernandez (Appellant’s

brief, p.2 n.1), the state will

use ‘CoP Tr.’ to refer t0

the transcript of the change of plea hearing, held February 25, 2019, and ‘Sent. Tr.’ to refer t0 the

of the sentencing hearing, held April 22, 2019.
pagination associated With each transcript.
transcript

Page references are

t0 the separate

Intensive Outpatient treatment” for substance abuse, but noted that he

community supervision

in light

0f his immigration

status.

(Id.)

was not a candidate

She recommended

that

for

he “serve

a period 0f local incarceration prior t0 his release t0 federal agents.” (PSI, p.15.)

At

recommended

sentencing, the state

indeterminate. (Sent. Tr., p.16,

L22 — p.17,

six

months

The prosecutor

L.8.)

could get some kind 0f treatment before he goes, but

Moran-Hernandez’s counsel

jail.” (Id.)

I

know

that

to a year ﬁxed, followed

I

don’t

stated, “It

know of any

by

would be

six years

great if he

that exists in our local

stated:

he asked for credit for time served. I guess 0n his behalf I would ask
I’m not extremely adverse to the general recommendations of the

for that, but

presentence investigation. Ithink they’re certainly appropriate and

be beneﬁcial,

if there’s

any way for him

to

do

so, t0 obtain

I

think

it

would

some kind 0f intensive

outpatient or outpatient treatment.

(Sent. T11, p.14, Ls.16-22.)

The

district court

judge stated that he had carefully reviewed the presentence report, and

acknowledged the goals 0f sentencing and the
p.18, Ls. 10-22.)

He

factors articulated in

LC.

§ 19-2521.

recognized that though this was Moran-Hernandez’s ﬁrst felony,

(Sent. Tr.,

it

was

his

second DUI, he was a moderate risk t0 reoffend, and substance abuse treatment was recommended.
(TL, p. 1 8, L.23

— p. 1 9, L.3 .) He noted that it was very likely Moran-Hernandez would be deported

a third time and that he had n0 power t0 prevent that.

Moran-Hemandez

that

it

was important

“to

make

(Sent. Tr., p.19, Ls.9-20.)

sure

you

get

The court

some type 0f treatment before

you’re released because if you get deported, the chances 0f you getting treatment in your

country

is

probably zero.”

the offense and the

Moran-Hernandez

— p.20,

L.4.)

to

(Sent. T11, p.20, Ls.13-17.) Finally,

manner

in

Which

it

told

home

acknowledging the seriousness 0f

had affected Moran-Hernandez’s family, he sentenced

two years ﬁxed followed by eight years indeterminate.

(Sent. Tr., p.19, L.25

The

district court entered judgment (R., pp.

128-3 1) and Moran-Hernandez timely appealed

(R., pp.134-37).

B.

Standard

Of Review

The length of a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse 0f discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472,

159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence

0f demonstrating that

it is

475 (2002); State

V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

Within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

is

a clear abuse of discretion. State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d

614, 615 (2001) (citing State V. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).

Whether a lower court abused
asks “whether the

its

trial court: (1)

In evaluating

discretion, the appellate court conducts a four—part inquiry,

Which

correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within

the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently With the legal standards applicable t0
the speciﬁc choices available t0

V. Herrera,

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by

the exercise 0f reason.”

164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg

V.

m

MV Fun Life,

163

Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

C.

Moran-Hernandez Has Shown No Abuse Of The

T0 bear
that,

District Court’s Sentencing Discretion

the burden 0f demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant

under any reasonable View of the

facts, the

sentence

was

excessive.

must

establish

State V. Farwell, 144

Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining Whether the appellant met

this

burden,

the court considers the entire sentence but presumes that the determinate portion will be the period

0f actual incarceration. State

Lver, 144
this

Idaho

at

V. Bailey,

161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing

726, 170 P.3d at 391).

“When

reviewing the reasonableness 0f a sentence,

Court conducts an independent review 0f the record, giving consideration to the nature of the

4

offense, the character of the offender

160 Idaho

1, 8,

and the protection of the public

interest.” State V.

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015). To establish that the sentence

must demonstrate

that reasonable

is

McIntosh,

excessive, the appellant

minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate

t0

accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

Fallen, 144 Idaho
substitute

its

at

736, 170 P.3d at 401. “‘In deference t0 the

trial

m

judge, this Court Will not

View 0f a reasonable sentence Where reasonable minds might

Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2018) (quoting State

V.

differ.”

,

Stevens, 146 Idaho

139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).

The

district court’s

uniﬁed sentence 0f ten years With two years ﬁxed was well within the

statutory limits: aggravated

18-8006(1)(a).

(ﬂ

discretion unless

sentence

DUI carries

R., pp. 128-3

a

maximum period of conﬁnement

of ﬁfteen years,

I.C. §

Thus, the sentence Will not be considered an abuse 0f

1 .)

Moran-Hernandez demonstrates

was necessary t0 accomplish any ofthe

that

n0 reasonable mind could conclude the

obj ectives of sentencing.

On appeal, his argument

focuses 0n the district court’s alleged failure to adequately consider certain purportedly mitigating
factors, including “potential

his remorse,

The

immigration ramifications,” his lack of previous felony convictions,

and his diagnosis 0f Type

district court

I

diabetes. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-1 1.) His

own

fails.

considered the allegedly mitigating considerations t0 Which he points on appeal

and abuse of discretion review “does not require (nor indeed, does
[its]

argument

it

evaluation 0f the weight t0 be given each 0f the sentencing considerations.”

Windom, 150 Idaho

873, 881, 253 P.3d 310, 318 (201

1);

m

permit) [this Court] t0 conduct

State V. Struhs, 158 Idaho 262, 269,

346

P.3d 279, 286 (2015).

The

district court

adequately considered Moran-Hernandez’s immigration status.

Moran-Hernandez acknowledges, the

district

court

As

ensured that he understood potential

immigration consequences prior t0 accepting his plea. (Appellant’s

brief, p.6.)

Moran-Hernandez

already had an immigration detainer and would be subject t0 immigration proceedings after

Whatever sentence the

acknowledged

that

district

court imposed.

he was very likely t0 be deported whatever sentence the

—

(Sent. Tr., p.15, L.19

whatever sentence the

And,

p.16, L.12.)

before, if deported again he

would be

district court

as he argues

that, in

attorney

district court

imposed.

between ﬁve and twenty years

ineligible for reentry for

imposed.

his

0n appeal, having been deported twice

(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

pointed t0 any immigration consequences associated With the

he argues

At sentencing,

p.15.)

(PSI,

Therefore, he has not

district court’s sentence.

addition t0 Whatever separation from his family

is

Instead,

attendant to his removal and

subsequent ineligibility for reentry, “the court has potentially delayed any possible reuniﬁcation

With his family by that
being released.”3

(Id.)

much
That

may still have t0

longer because he

is,

his

argument

is

serve the entire ten years before

not that the district court’s sentence has some

immigration consequence, but that any term 0f incarceration would keep him separated from his
family longer than he would already be as a result of his pending deportation.

The

district court

was

sensitive to the fact that

Moran-Hernandez was

likely t0

be deported

but was focused 0n furthering the sentencing goal of rehabilitation. The court acknowledged that

Moran-Hernandez was

likely t0

be removed, but noted

Ls.9-20.) In imposing the sentence

it

did, the court

it

had n0 control over that.

emphasized the importance of ensuring

Moran-Hernandez received some substance abuse treatment, which
receive if he

17.)

3

was simply released and deported.

(Sent. Tr., p.14, L.23

Indeed, Moran-Hernandez’s attorney agreed that

it

“would

In reviewing the length of a sentence, this Court presumes that the

of conﬁnement.

E

“potential delay”

is

(Sent. Tr., p.19,

it

—

did not think he would
p.15, L.14; p.20, Ls.13-

certainly be appropriate”

ﬁxed portion

ﬁxed portion of the

sentence, or

two

years.

and

will be the term

State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

the

that

Thus, the

“beneﬁcial” for Moran-Hernandez to be sentenced to a term of incarceration so that he could
receive treatment. (Sent. Tr., p. 14, Ls. 16-22.)

was not a candidate

The

district court

community supervision due

for

concluded that Moran-Hernandez

t0 his immigration status

and impending

deportation (Sent. Tr., p.20, Ls.11-13), a conclusion with which Moran-Hernandez’s attorney

again agreed (Sent. Tr., p.15, L.10

— p.16,

L.4) and that he does not challenge

0n appeal. Thus,

t0

serve the purpose of rehabilitation, the district court reasonably concluded that a term 0f

incarceration

was necessary so

that

he could secure substance abuse treatment. (Sent.

Tr., p.20,

Ls.13-17.)

Nor did the

district court fail t0

of prior felony convictions.
(Sent. Tr., p. 1 7, Ls. 1 6-23)

Moran-Hernandez addressed the court and expressed

and the

convictions (Sent. Tr., p.18, L.23

was

his second

DUI

risk to reoffend,

As

adequately consider Moran-Hernandez’s remorse and lack

district court explicitly

— p.19,

L.3).

acknowledged that he had no prior felony

At the same

time, though, the court noted that this

conviction, that the presentence investigator concluded that he

and that he was “in need of Level

was moderate

2.1 substance abuse outpatient treatment.” (Id.)

discussed above, the court concluded and Moran-Hernandez’s attorney agreed that substance

abuse treatment was necessary and that he was unlikely to receive
incarceration.

The court

also

Moran-Hernandez’s family.
his

remorse

his

it

absent a period of

emphasized the serious nature 0f the crime and the
(Sent. Tr., p.19, Ls.21-24).

Thus, the

district court

effect

for

determination was reasonable.
discretion

factors.

by simply

purposes

it

imposed

of rehabilitation and also for punishment.

Moran-Hemandez cannot show

had on

considered both

remorse and his lack ofprior felonies as mitigating, but determined that the sentence

was necessary primarily

it

that the district court

That

abused

its

registering disagreement with the district court’s weighing of mitigating

Moran-Hernandez argues

Last,

diagnosis of

Type

I

that the district court failed to adequately consider his

diabetes as mitigating.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-1

how that diagnosis would be mitigating. He

explanation

after his incarceration,

diagnosis.”

his diabetes,

is likely,

he

is

cites State V.

little

claims, “Since he Will likely be deported

But

that is a

consequence 0f the deportation that he

not the district court’s sentence. If his concern

sure t0 have that access while incarcerated.

Hernandez suggest

provides

he will lose access t0 the treatment provider he has been seeing since that

(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)

acknowledges

He

1.)

that

Nor do

having a medical condition of any sort

is

is

access to treatment for

the cases cited

by Moran-

automatically mitigating.

James, 112 Idaho 239, 731 P.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1986), and State

V.

He

Turner, 136 Idaho

629, 38 P.3d 1285 (Ct. App. 2001). (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) In James, a district court considered
the defendant’s need for surgery and desire to have that surgery performed

while considering but denying a Rule 35 motion.

m,

Court of Appeals afﬁrmed the denial of that motion. Li

Hernandez has never claimed

that there is

noted that a

would

district court

interfere

at

at

243, 731 P.2d at 238. The

243-44, 38 P.3d at 238-39. Moran-

some treatment provider from

receive treatment for his diabetes and, as noted above,
court’s sentence, that

112 Idaho

it is

by a doctor ofhis choice

Whom it is

his immigration status, not the district

with that treatment. In

m,

the Court 0f Appeals simply

had considered the appellant’s “poor health and used

following the state’s recommendation of a ﬁxed

life

important he

it

as a basis for not

sentence” while rejecting the appellant’s

challenge to his sentence. Turner, 136 Idaho at 636, 38 P.3d at 1292. That case does not suggest

that

any health condition

is

automatically a mitigating factor that the district court must consider,

Whether or not the condition
than out.
reasonable.

But even

As

is life

threatening 0r can be treated as 0r

more

effectively in prison

if his diabetes diagnosis is mitigating, the district court’s

discussed above, the district court reasonably determined that

it

sentence was

was necessary to

serve the purposes of rehabilitation and punishment, notwithstanding his diagnosis of diabetes

about which the

district court

was well aware.

(Sent. Tr., p.13, Ls.10-21

(defense counsel

discussing diabetes diagnosis).)

The

district court

did not abuse

its

discretion

When

it

considered the information before

it,

along with the objectives of criminal punishment, and imposed a sentence of ten years with two
years ﬁxed.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment of the

district court.

DATED this 24th day 0f February, 2020.

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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